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INTRODUCTION
The Internet and e-commerce have created a borderless market.
Goods and services sold on the Internet are subject to the patent statutes
and regulations of all countries in which customers have access. Be-
cause the presence or absence of patent protection-or variations in that
protection-hinders the movement of goods and services throughout the
Internet, it is necessary to harmonize the protection afforded by Internet
patents in their early stages of development. Among the three papers,
however, only Professor Chiappetta touched upon the problem of com-
pliance with the provisions in TRIPS. None of the papers paid attention
to the feasibility of harmonizing their proposal with the patent systems
of America's important trade partners: the EU and Japan.
This commentary will focus on the participants' proposals relative
to the laws of other countries. Particularly, assuming that the same pro-
posals were to be made in an international negotiation, my commentary
reflects potential reactions and responses from Japanese and European
delegates.
I. PROFESSOR CHIAPPETTA'S PROPOSAL
In general, I agree with Professor Chiappetta that the "competitive
arts" are not proper patentable subject matter. That is, claims directed
solely to pure competitive arts without computer implementation should
not be patentable. His proposal to exclude pure competitive arts from
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patent eligible subject matter is in line with the current practice under
the Japanese Patent Law and the European Patent Convention. For
example, Japanese Patent Law defines an invention-patent-eligible
subject matter-as an advanced technological idea using a law of
nature.' In other words, the statutory definition includes two important
elements: (1) the claimed subject matter must relate to technological art;
and (2) the claimed subject matter must result from an application or
utilization of a law of nature, instead of such law itself.2 Thus, pure
competitive arts, which have no technological nature, do not meet the
first element.
This clear definition of patent-eligible subject matter, in theory,
should prevent confusion among the Japanese patent community with
respect to the question whether claims regarding software, or including
a mathematical formula, are patent-eligible subject matter. Since soft-
ware is not a law of nature itself, insofar as it utilizes the physical
resources of computer hardware it should undoubtedly be patent-eligible
subject matter. That being said, inclusion of a mathematical formula
should not influence the patentability of a claim as long as the claim
was directed to the application of a mathematical formula.
U.S. case law, however, introduced significant confusion into the
Japanese patent community-leading to extensive debate surrounding
the patentability of computer software. Early examination guidelines
published by the Japanese Patent Office ("JPO") clearly reflected this
confusion imported from the United States! The JPO, however, re-
solved the confusion early on by focusing on the statutory definition.
The JPO's 1993 Examination Guidelines gave a clear interpretation of
"the application of a law of nature" in the computer software context.4 It
would seem that the definitions and examples included in the JPO ex-
amination guidelines could help the U.S. legal community understand
the proper scope of subject matter patents; not only for software but for
Internet applications as well.
For example, the JPO guidelines deem proper a data processing
software claim when the data processing is executed on the basis of the
physical and technical nature of an object (including its structural prop-
1. Japanese Patent Law, Art. 2, 2.
2. Id.
3. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTER PROGRAM
No. 1 (1975); JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, EXAMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS FOR
MICRO-COMPUTER APPLICATION TECHNOLOGY RELATED INVENTIONS (1982); JAPANESE
PATENT OFFICE, DRAFT EXAMINATION PROPOSAL FOR COMPUTER SOFTVARE RELATED IN-
VENTIONS (1988).
4. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND UTILITY
MODEL IN JAPAN VIII 3 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 JPO Guidelines].
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erty). Thus, the type of claims disputed in Alappat5 would have been
clearly patentable under the Japanese Patent Law. Claims disputed in
State Street Bank,6 moreover, would have been patentable. In fact, the
1993 Examination Guidelines included an example of claims similar to
the claims disputed in Alappat; concluding that those sorts of claims
were clearly patent-eligible subject matter.7 The 1997 Implementation
Guidelines for Software Related Inventions also included an example
similar to the claims disputed in State Street Bank and concluded that
they were directed to patent eligible subject matter.8
Likewise, European countries have suffered from the confusion in-
troduced by U.S. case law. The influence of U.S. case law on the
European Patent Convention is clear.9 Provisions defining a list of un-
patentable inventions reflect the U.S. case law doctrines from the 1970s,
when the Convention was executed." This list is miserably outdated
because the U.S. Supreme Court has since clarified, in more recent deci-
sions, that its list includes only three items: natural phenomena, the laws
of nature and an abstract idea." To harmonize its law with recent devel-
opments in the United States and Japan, European countries have
struggled since to expunge the extensive list of explicit exclusions, in-
cluding computer software and business methods.
Because of the astonishingly broad terms used by Judge Rich in
State Street Bank, the United States may again export confusion to other
countries. Surprisingly, this may occur even though the portion of State
Street Bank discussing the patentability of a business method may
amount to nothing more than dicta. 2 After discovering that the USPTO
has interpreted State Street Bank broadly, both Japan and European
countries are exploring the possibility of removing the restriction limit-
ing patent eligible subject matter to the "technological arts."
Recognizing the risk brought about by patent protection for com-
petitive arts, Professor Chiappetta proposes sui generis protection for
competitive art innovation. However, a proposal for sui generis protec-
tion to accommodate industry specific needs is not a new idea. A good
5. hz re Alappt, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
6. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
7. 1993 JPO Guidelines, supra note 4, at 23 ex. 4.
8. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES FOR SOFTwARE RELATED
INVENTIONS ex. 4 (1997).
9. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268 (as
amended Dec. 21, 1978) [hereinafter European Patent Convention].
10. European Patent Convention, Art. 52, 2.
11. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
12. John Thomas, The Patentability of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1139,
1161 (1999).
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example is the sui generis protection for computer software proposed by
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"). 3 Like
the proposal made by Professor Chiappetta, MITI's sui generis com-
puter protection proposal provided a protection term shorter than the
patent term and provided compulsory licensure. 14 The United States,
however, extensively criticized these short life and compulsory license
provisions." As a result, MITI was forced to give up its sui generis
protection proposal. This experience suggests adoption of Professor
Chiappetta's proposal would face strong objections from U.S. industry.
To assure compliance between his proposal and the provisions of
TRIPS defining patentable subject matter, Professor Chiappetta adopts a
narrow interpretation of "all fields of technology" in order to exclude
competitive arts.16 This narrow interpretation, however, may give room
to developing countries to refuse traditional intellectual property pro-
tection for new types of technology that may be developed in the future.
Such an interpretation, in the least, gives these countries an excuse for
protecting new subject matter by a regime that is more restrictive than
traditional intellectual property regimes.
In contrast, the benefit of protecting new types of subject matter
through a traditional intellectual property regime such as patents is ob-
vious. Once competitive arts are incorporated as patent-eligible subject
matter, the duty to provide patent protection on them will automatically
be imposed on all WTO member countries. This will effectively serve
as a means for international harmonization. Considering the borderless
nature of Internet patents and e-commerce, it is senseless to introduce a
sui generis protection scheme, which would require renegotiation of
TRIPS.
IX. PROFESSOR LUNNEY'S PROPOSAL
Professor Lunney's proposal, to view the nonobviousness standard
in the context of investment in creativity, is definitely a nonobvious idea
for evaluating inventions to distinguish those qualified for protection
from others. He may not be the first person to discuss a lead-time argu-
ment but he has made the popular theory more sophisticated by
13. MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE COMM.
INFORMATION INDUSTRY SUBCOMIM., PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL, Dec. 1983, reprinted in
NOBUHiRo NAKCAYAMA, LEGAL PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE 214 app. 2 (1988).
14. NAKAYAMA, supra note 13, at 222-24.
15. NAKAYAMA, supra note 13, at 12-13.
16. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, 108
Stat. 4809, 4811-4828, 33 I.L.M. 81, 83-111 [hereinafter TRIPS].
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combining that argument with investment in creativity as a means for
assessing nonobviousness.
For traditional lawyers who are not familiar with an economic
analysis, it is very difficult to determine the appropriateness of his as-
sumption-that products involving more creativity investment are easier
to copy than products requiring less creativity investment. Thus, a few
examples would greatly help the readers understand his analysis. Par-
ticularly, I would like to see some case studies on Internet patents to
show the appropriateness of his assumption. It seems to me that most
Internet patents are easy to copy regardless of the creativity involved in
the invention. Furthermore, it is not clear to me how investments are
classified as creative versus non-creative. Inclusion of examples would
help clarify this distinction.
Professor Lunney's nonobviousness standard, measured by invest-
ment, is a challenge to the traditional notion of "inventive step." The
concept of "inventive step" has been uniformly adopted by countries
outside the United States in evaluating the quality of an invention. 7
"Inventive step" theory represents a model that evaluates an invention in
the context of a distance from the state of art or the prior art. 8 This dis-
tance has nothing to do with the investment made by the inventor in
developing the invention. Simply, an advance or difference from the
prior art often does not reflect the investment made by the inventor.
This problem-solution approach, used by the European Patent Office
and the Japan Patent Office, was developed based on this theoretical
model for assessing the inventive step.' 9
Professor Lunney's solution proposes setting a marginal creative in-
vestment fraction to give rise to a presumption of nonobviousness. Such a
solution, however, may discriminate against one field of technology com-
pared to another. This, in turn, may lead to a violation of TRIPS
provisions.20 For example, Internet patents seem to demand more crea-
tivity investment than traditional innovations such as chemical or
pharmaceutical inventions which require substantial investment for
testing and implementation. Moreover, such a solution may encourage
ineffective investment in creativity. For these reasons, it would be very
17. European Patent Convention, art. 56.
18. For a general discussion on the inventive step see HANNS ULRICH, STANDARD OF
PATENTABILITY FOR EUROPEAN INVENTIONS: SHOULD AN INVENTIVE STEP ADVANCE THE
ART? (1977).
19. EPC Examination Guidelines, C-IV, 9, available at http:www.european-patent-
office.org; JPO Patent and Utility Model Examination Guidelines, 11-2, available at
http://www.jpo-miti.go.jp.
20. TRIPS, art. 27, 1.
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difficult to persuade U.S. trade partners to adopt Professor Lunney's
proposal.
III. PROFESSOR BAGLEY'S PROPOSAL
Professor Bagley urges the courts and the USPTO to adopt a broad
concept of analogous art. The doctrine of analogous art, however, is dif-
ficult to apply. This is because the scope of applicability changes when
the definition of the relevant problem changes. As Professor Bagley
properly points out, when the problem is defined broadly, as done by
U.S. courts in earlier cases, the courts and the USPTO can cite every
reference from different fields of technology. In contrast, references
from different fields are excluded from the examination of nonbovious-
ness when the problem is narrowly defined as done In re Clay2 ' or
Amazon.comrn Accordingly, a serious flaw inherent to the doctrine of
analogous art is its arbitrary nature of defining the applicable scope.
Unfortunately, Professor Bagley's criticism does not provide a
means for defining the problem of analogous art objectively. She ob-
served that the application of problem solutions in one area to another
area is a common practice in business fields and thus urges inclusion of
all real life activities in assessing the prior art for business model pat-
ents. Application of solutions from one area to another, however, is
common practice in technology fields. This does not give enough of an
excuse in traditional technology inventions for removing the limitations
on the scope of prior art imposed by the doctrine of analogous art.
A hint for objectively defining a relevant problem may be found in
the European and Japanese patent systems. For attorneys practicing in
these systems, the doctrine of analogous art is a familiar doctrine, as-
sessing nonobviousness or inventiveness in the context of the problem
to be solved by the invention. Like the doctrine of analogous art, the
analysis under the problem-solution approach7 starts with the determi-
nation of the scope of relevant or analogous prior art. The scope is
determined by identifying the most relevant prior art reference that re-
lates to the same technical fields as the invention or to a closely related
area in the context of the problem related to the invention.
24
21. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
22. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (w.D. Wash.
1999), vacated by 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
23. EPC Guidelines, supra note 19; IPO Guidelines, supra note 19.
24. G. Knesch, Assessing Inventive Step in Examination and Opposition Proceedings,
3 EPI Information 95 (1994).
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Both the European Patent Office (EPO) and the Japan Patent Office,
however, have struggled to objectively define the problem without using
hindsight. To identify the problem to be solved by the inventor, examin-
ers necessarily look at the invention and then evaluate the problem by
comparing it with the prior art to see what was not solved by the prior
art. This process inevitably introduces hindsight because the analysis
starts from the invention, instead of the prior art. Such an analysis may
lead to examiners formulating the problem in such a way that already
includes elements needed to solve the problem.'
Defineing an appropriate measure for assessing the nonobviousness
of business model patents or Internet patents requires redefining the hy-
pothetical person of ordinary skills in the relevant art-properly
reflecting real life inventive activities. For example, to develop Internet
patents, a businessperson will collaborate with a web-designer or com-
puter engineer. Current U.S. law, however, presumes a single person,
although he or she is supposed to have knowledge in different fields
relating to the problem of the invention. Under both the EPO and JPO
guidelines, 6 where it is more appropriate to think in terms of a group of
persons, examiners are allowed to assume a group of experts in assess-
ing nonobviousness. This may effectively prevent the USPTO from
granting obvious Internet patents, and may serve to harmonize U.S. law
with the EPO and the JPO.
CONCLUSION
All symposium's participants presented interesting ideas, identify-
ing the risks resulting from granting Internet patents and proposing new
ways of distinguishing inventions that are qualified for patents from
others that are not qualified. Their way of thinking, however, seems to
be extremely local, paying little attention to the U.S. position in the in-
ternational IP arena. Many aspects of these proposals do not fit well
with the norms adopted in existing international agreements. U.S. schol-
ars and the legal community should learn from the experience of
patenting software and develop a norm for Internet patents which are
capable of harmonization with the practice of America's major trade
partners as well as with existing international agreements.
25. Such an analysis should be rejected as using hindsight. For example, see T229/85,
1987 Official Journal of European Patent Office 237.
26. EPO Guidelines, supra note 19, at C-IV, 9.6; JPO Guidelines, supra note 19, at 11-2,
2000-20011

